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1325 
THE BLACK BOX SOLUTION TO  
AUTONOMOUS LIABILITY 
Imagine walking out your front door, newspaper and coffee in hand, 
ready to start the day. You open your car door, press the on button and 
proceed to work on today’s crossword, sipping your coffee, as you are 
chauffeured to work by your autonomous vehicle. Imagine the significance 
of this ride. Imagine the productivity you gain—an extra hour for work? 
An extra hour of reflection? Imagine the benefits to your family—your 
elderly parents could achieve their desired independence, and you would 
not have to worry about your teenager crashing into a mailbox every time 
he or she pulls out of the driveway.  
More importantly, imagine the potential to save lives. Autonomous 
vehicles may significantly lower the number of car accidents in the United 
States.
1
 As human error has been found to be a contributing cause of over 
ninety percent of car accidents,
2
 taking responsibility for driving out of the 
hands of the driver would significantly decrease the number of accidents 
that occur every year, and save thousands of lives.
3
  
While the idea of a car that drives itself evokes images of science 
fiction, autonomous vehicles are no longer relegated to Minority Report
4
 
and I, Robot
5—rather, they are being developed today by Google,6 
Toyota,
7
 Nissan,
8
 Audi
9
 and Tesla.
10
 There is no question that such 
 
 
 1. NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., NO. 14-13, 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT OF POLICY CONCERNING AUTOMATED VEHICLES 1 (2013), available at 
www.nhtsa.gov/staticfiles/rulemaking/pdf/Automated_Vehicles_Policy.pdf. 
 2. NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., DOT HS-805-085, TRI-
LEVEL STUDY OF THE CAUSES OF TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS 28 (1979), available at http://ntl.bts.gov/ 
lib/25000/25500/25515/DOT-HS-805-085.pdf.  
 3. In 2011, NHTSA estimates that there were 5,338,000 police-reported car accidents, resulting 
in over 32,367 deaths. NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., DOT HS-
811-753, TRAFFIC SAFETY FACTS 2011 DATA 1 (2013), available at http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/ 
Pubs/811753.pdf. Given these figures, if autonomous vehicles were in use in 2011 and all accidents to 
which human error contributed did not occur, there would only have been 533,800 police-reported car 
accidents during the year. Assuming that no other factors influence fatalities in car accidents, 29,130 
lives might have been saved through the use of autonomous vehicles in 2011. 
 Autonomous vehicles also have potential environmental benefits. According to the NHTSA, 
autonomous vehicles may conserve fuel by “automatically accelerat[ing] and brak[ing] with the flow 
of traffic” and “eliminating the traffic congestion that crashes cause every day on our roads.” NHTSA, 
supra note 1, at 1 (2013). The NHTSA also foresees “corresponding reductions in greenhouse gas 
emissions.” Id.  
 4. MINORITY REPORT (Twentieth Century Fox 2002).  
 5. I, ROBOT (Twentieth Century Fox 2004). 
 6. See John Markoff, Google Cars Drive Themselves, In Traffic, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2010, at 
A1. 
 7. See Toyota Sneak Previews Self-Drive Car Ahead of Tech Show, BBC (Jan. 4, 2013), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-20910769 [hereinafter Toyota Sneak Previews]. 
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vehicles will revolutionize industries—from transportation to insurance—
and change travel forever.  
Car functions fit into five categories: no-automation, function-specific 
automation, combined function automation, limited self-driving 
automation, and full self-driving automation.
11
 No-automation is the type 
of driving experience that is currently the norm: the driver has full control 
of steering, speed, and other functionality. Function-specific automation, 
combined function automation, and limited self-driving automation are 
intermediary levels of automation, ranging from antilock braking systems 
to adaptive cruise control.
12
 Full self-driving automation is the most 
advanced of these categories and is the type of functionality envisioned in 
an autonomous vehicle. These vehicles are “designed to perform all 
safety-critical driving functions and monitor roadway conditions for an 
entire trip.”13 Essentially, they replace the driver by guiding and operating 
themselves. This frees the user’s time, creates opportunities for individuals 
with less mobility, and increases overall road safety. For all of the 
benefits, autonomous vehicles raise a number of issues that have yet to be 
tackled by legislators or legal scholars.  
The first of these questions is a threshold question: To avoid barriers to 
manufacturing related to tort liability, what could manufacturers use to 
correctly determine who is liable in tort in the event of a car crash? This 
Note argues that the inclusion of a mechanism to monitor and record data 
about vehicle functioning, known as an Event Data Recorder (“EDR”), 
aboard autonomous vehicles is the solution. This technology is analogous 
to the Flight Data Recorders (“FDR”), colloquially known as a “black 
box,” found on airplanes. An FDR records and transmits information 
about the airplane’s functionality, as well as pilot error. By analyzing this 
information, investigators can easily determine whether the cause of a 
plane crash was human error or mechanical failure. The same would apply 
to autonomous vehicles. Manufacturers would be more secure about their 
 
 
 8. See Alex Taylor III, Nissan Goes Big on Self-Driving Cars, CNN MONEY (Sept. 4, 2013), 
http://money.cnn.com/2013/09/04/autos/nissan-360-irvine.fortune/index.html. 
 9. See Tom Simonite, Audi Shrinks the Autonomous Car, MIT TECHNOLOGY REVIEW (Jan. 8, 
2013), http://www.technologyreview.com/news/509676/audi-shrinks-the-autonomous-car/. 
 10. See m4tt, Elon Musk in Talks with Google to Bring Driverless Tech to Tesla Cars, THE 
VERGE (May 7, 2013, 11:07 AM), http://www.theverge.com/2013/5/7/4308288/elon-musk-talks-
google-driverless-tech-tesla.  
 11. NHTSA, supra note 1, at 4–5. 
 12. Id.; U.S. Department of Transportation Releases Policy on Automated Vehicle Development, 
NHTSA (May 30, 2013), http://www.nhtsa.gov/About+NHTSA/Press+Releases/U.S.+Department+ 
of+Transportation+Releases+Policy+on+Automated+Vehicle+Development.  
 13. NHTSA, supra note 1, at 5.  
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financial liability in tort claims, thus increasing their willingness to 
develop the new technology. However, issues related to the data recorded 
on EDRs will arise that may prevent manufacturers and users from 
adopting the technology. To provide comfort for users while protecting 
manufacturer interests, consumer privacy protections must secure and 
limit EDR data usage. Vehicle user ownership of the EDR data and a 
requirement of affirmative consent for any commercial use of data should 
be mandated. 
This Note will explore the development of autonomous technology, 
barriers to manufacturing, a solution in the mandatory inclusion of EDRs 
aboard autonomous vehicles, and consumer protections that must be put in 
place to secure EDR data. Part I will provide a background of autonomous 
vehicles, including historical development and current legislation. Part II 
will discuss the issue of tort liability and how it may serve as a barrier to 
manufacturing of autonomous vehicles. Part III will argue that requiring 
EDRs on autonomous vehicles will ensure car manufacturers that liability 
will be assigned accurately, and the manufacturers will be responsible for 
only failures of their own products. Part IV asserts that consumer privacy 
protections must be implemented to prevent misuse of EDR data.  
I. BACKGROUND OF AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES 
A. Historical Development 
As a result of the potential societal benefits from autonomous vehicles, 
the incentives for creating this technology have become apparent. 
Originally, the idea of self-driving vehicles arose from the national 
security interest in creating unmanned vehicles that could be used for 
military purposes.
14
 In 2004, the Defense Advanced Research Projects 
Agency (“DARPA”) created the Grand Challenge, which challenged 
inventors to create cars that could drive themselves 150 miles across the 
Mojave Desert.
15
 While no cars completed the 2004 Grand Challenge,
16
 
DARPA extended another challenge in 2005.
17
 During the 2005 Grand 
 
 
 14. Grand Challenge Overview, DARPA, http://archive.darpa.mil/grandchallenge04/overview. 
htm (last visited Jan. 8, 2014). “The purpose of the DARPA Grand Challenge 2004 is to leverage 
American ingenuity to accelerate the development of autonomous vehicle technologies that can be 
applied to military requirements.” Id. 
 15. The DARPA Grand Challenge: Ten Years Later, DARPA (Mar. 13, 2014), http://www. 
darpa.mil/newsevents/releases/2014/03/13.aspx.  
 16. Id. 
 17. Grand Challenge ‘05, DARPA, http://archive.darpa.mil/grandchallenge05/ (last visited Jan. 
8, 2014).  
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Challenge, five cars completed the 132-mile course over desert terrain,
18
 
with four of the cars completing the race in less than ten hours.
19
 In 2007, 
DARPA held its last Grand Challenge, requiring cars to drive sixty miles 
“in an urban environment, complete with four-way stop signs, lanes that 
merge, and moving vehicle traffic.”20 Six teams successfully completed 
the final challenge.
21
  
Google Inc. (“Google”) became enamored with the prospect of creating 
self-driving cars. In 2005, one of their engineers, Sebastian Thrun, led the 
Stanford Racing Team to victory in DARPA’s 2005 Grand Challenge.22 
Thrun and Larry Page, one of Google’s co-founders, were early promoters 
of the potential of autonomous cars to “make highways safer and lower the 
nation’s energy costs.”23 Over the next six years, Google continued 
investing in autonomous vehicle technology.  
In 2011, Google decided it had the capacity to put autonomous vehicles 
on public roadways and began lobbying for preemptive legislation to deal 
with the introduction of autonomous vehicles.
24
 On June 4, 2011, Google 
lobbyist, David Goldwater, spoke before the Nevada Senate Committee on 
Finance in support of legislation allowing autonomous vehicles to operate 
on the public roadways of Nevada.
25
 Goldwater’s statements indicated the 
leaps and bounds Google had made in its autonomous technology since the 
Grand Challenge in 2005.
26
 Instead of manufacturing its own cars, Google 
harnessed the existing technology in cars such as the Toyota Prius and 
Audi TT, and added the systems necessary to allow the cars to operate 
autonomously.
27
 According to Goldwater, an autonomous vehicle “uses 
 
 
 18. K. Krasnow Waterman & Matthew T. Henshon, Imagine the Ram-If-Ications: Assessing 
Liability for Robotics-Based Car Accidents, SCITECH LAW., Spring 2009, at 14. 
 19. DARPA, supra note 17. The Stanford Racing Team won the $2 million prize with its time of 
six hours and fifty-three minutes. Id. 
 20. Waterman & Henshon, supra note 18, at 14.  
 21. DARPA Urban Challenge, ARCHIVE.DARPA.MIL, http://archive.darpa.mil/grandchallenge/ 
index.asp (last visited Jan. 8, 2014).  
 22. Markoff, supra note 6. Sebastian Thrun was a “director of the Stanford Artificial Intelligence 
Laboratory, a Google engineer and the co-inventor of the Street View mapping service.” Id.  
 23. Id. 
 24. John Markoff, Google Lobbies Nevada to Allow Driverless Cars, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 2011, 
at A18; Amir Efrati, Google’s Driverless Car Draws Political Power, WALL ST. J., Oct. 12, 2012, 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10000872396390443493304578034822744854696.  
 25. Nev. S. Comm. on Fin., Minutes, 76th Sess., at 36 (June 4, 2011).  
 26. Id. at 36–37. 
 27. Id. Google’s autonomous vehicles are driven by an extremely advanced system of GPS and 
sensors. In an aside attached to Adam Fisher’s Popular Science article, Inside Google’s Quest to  
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artificial intelligence, global positioning system, radar, lasers, cameras and 
internal sensors to create a three-dimensional view of the road.”28 
While Google may be the “pioneer of self-driving cars,”29 other car 
companies are quickly getting into the business. Audi AG and Toyota 
Motor Corporation (“Toyota”), both companies whose vehicles Google is 
currently using to test its autonomous technology, are beginning to 
develop their own autonomous models.
30
 Nissan Motor Co., Ltd. 
(“Nissan”) is also planning to enter the autonomous vehicle market. 
Nissan’s goal, according to its current Chief Executive Officer Carlos 
Ghosn, is to place an autonomous vehicle on the market by 2020.
31
 Among 
the potential developers is Tesla Motors, Inc. (“Tesla”), an innovative car 
company known for its electric vehicles. Tesla Chief Executive Officer, 
Elon Musk, stated that his company plans to produce autonomous vehicles 
by 2016.
32
 
B. Current Legislation  
With the rise of competition and the creation of the new marketplace, 
companies interested in investing in autonomous vehicle technology are 
 
 
Popularize Self-Driving Cars, Graham Murdoch describes how Google’s autonomous vehicles see the 
world: 
Once a driver activates the autonomous mode, the vehicle’s drive-by-wire system transfers 
control of the brake, gas, and steering to an onboard computer. The vehicle’s roof-mounted 
lidar (or light detection and ranging) unit probes 360 degrees with 64 laser beams, taking 
more than a million measurements per second. This data forms a high-resolution map 
(accurate to about 11 cm) of the car’s surroundings. Prebuilt navigation maps indicate static 
infrastructure, such as telephone poles, crosswalks, and traffic lights, which enables software 
to quickly identify moving objects, like pedestrians and cyclists. These targets are clustered 
together and tracked so that algorithms can process the traffic situation and plot a path safely 
through it. 
Adam Fisher, Inside Google’s Quest to Popularize Self-Driving Cars, POPULAR SCI. (Sept. 18, 2013), 
http://www.popsci.com/cars/article/2013-09/google-self-driving-car. For more information on the 
specific technology used in autonomous vehicles, see Erico Guizzo, How Google’s Self-Driving Car 
Works, IEEE SPECTRUM (Oct. 18, 2011), http://spectrum.ieee.org/automaton/robotics/artificial-
intelligence/how-google-self-driving-car-works. 
 28. Nev. S. Comm. on Fin., supra note 25, at 36. 
 29. Markoff, supra note 6. 
 30. See Simonite, supra note 9; Toyota Sneak Previews, supra note 7.  
 31. See Press Release, Nissan Motor Corporation, Nissan Announces Unprecedented 
Autonomous Drive Benchmarks (Aug. 27, 2013), available at http://www.nissan-global.com/ 
EN/NEWS/2013/_STORY/130828-02-e.html. Among Nissan’s goals are to create a “revolutionary 
commercially-viable Autonomous Drive in multiple vehicles by the year 2020,” and to provide 
“availability across the model range within two vehicle generations.” Id.  
 32. Ellie Zolfagharifard, Tesla Battles Google in Race to Get Driverless Cars on the Road, 
DAILY MAIL, Jan. 7, 2014, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-2424312/Teslas-Elon-
Musk-says-self-driving-cars-produced-2016.html.  
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lobbying for regulation of new issues that will arise as a result of 
autonomous vehicles. With the advent of these new vehicles, “technology 
is now advancing so quickly that it is in danger of outstripping existing 
law, some of which dates back to the era of horse-drawn carriages.”33 Cars 
operated by humans have extensive regulations and many of these will 
apply to autonomous vehicles. Autonomous vehicles, which are controlled 
by GPS and sensors as opposed to a human driver, will raise a myriad of 
new issues that may not be reconcilable with current regulations. Among 
these issues is tort liability—specifically, determining the party 
responsible for causing a vehicular accident. This Note will focus on 
providing and defending a method that may be used to establish liability in 
case of an accident.  
According to Google lobbyist David Goldwater, “forward-looking” 
legislation may allow states to avoid the problem of “technology 
outpac[ing] the law.”34 If states are able to promulgate laws to deal with 
predictable legal issues, citizens and businesses will both have legal 
guidance in making decisions about the technology during the 
development process and when it is released.  
Currently, Nevada, California, Florida, Michigan, and the District of 
Columbia have adopted regulations for autonomous vehicles.
35
 Nevada 
was the first state to pass legislation on autonomous vehicles.
36
 Its law 
went into effect on March 1, 2012, and the first autonomous vehicle 
driver’s license was issued on May 8, 2012.37 Nevada was followed by 
 
 
 33. Markoff, supra note 24. 
 34. Nev. S. Comm. on Fin., supra note 25, at 36. 
 35. See CAL. VEH. CODE § 38750 (West 2012); D.C. CODE § 50-2352 (2012); FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 319.145 (2012); NEV. ADMIN. CODE § 482A (2012).  
 36. Google Gets License to Operate Driverless Cars in Nevada, CNN (May 8, 2012), 
http://edition.cnn.com/2012/05/07/tech/nevada-driveless-car/; Paul A. Eisenstein, Nevada First State 
to Authorize Driverless Cars, NBC NEWS (Feb. 21, 2012), http://www.nbcnews.com/business/nevada-
first-state-authorize-driverless-cars-157736; Tiffany Hsu, Nevada Authorizes Driverless Cars (like the 
ones at Google), L.A. TIMES, June 24, 2011, http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/technology/2011/06/ 
nevada-authorizes-driverless-cars-like-the-ones-at-google.html. It is not completely clear why Google 
approached Nevada first, but the author would speculate that it might have been a result of its lower 
insurance requirements. See infra note 49. 
 37. Mary Slosson, Google Gets First Self-Driven Car License in Nevada, REUTERS (May 8, 
2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/05/08/uk-usa-nevada-google-idUSLNE84701320120508.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss5/8
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Florida,
38
 California,
 39
 and the District of Columbia.
40
 Effective March 
2014, Michigan also passed legislation.
41
  
All four states and the District of Columbia have passed similar 
regulations in a number of areas. All have defined autonomous vehicles 
using similar language, such as “a vehicle capable of navigating . . . 
roadways and interpreting traffic-control devices without a driver actively 
operating any of the vehicle’s control systems.”42 All have excluded the 
semi-autonomous technology that may currently be found in vehicles, 
such as “electronic blind spot assistance, crash avoidance, emergency 
braking, parking assistance, adaptive cruise control, lane keep assistance, 
lane departure warning, and traffic jam and queuing assistance,” from the 
definition of autonomous vehicles.
43
 They have also defined operators or 
drivers of autonomous vehicles similarly, either as the individual who 
“causes the autonomous vehicle to engage”44 or the “human operator” of 
the autonomous vehicle.
45
  
However, the regulations differ in a number of ways, including 
licensing requirements, insurance, and necessary safety devices. Nevada, 
unlike California, Florida, Washington D.C., and Michigan, has imposed 
 
 
 38. Ana M. Valdes, Florida Embraces Self-Driving Cars, as Engineers and Lawmakers Prepare 
for the New Technology, WPTV WEST PALM BEACH (May 7, 2012), http://www.wptv.com/dpp/news/ 
state/florida-embraces-self-driving-cars-as-engineers-and-lawmakers-prepare-for-the-new-technology.  
 39. John Oram, Governor Brown Signs California Driverless Car Law at Google HQ, VR (Sept. 
27, 2012), http://www.vrworld.com/news/2012/9/27/governor-brown-signs-california-driverless-car-
law-at-google-hq-.aspx.  
 40. D.C. CODE § 50-2352 (2012). 
 41. MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 257.2b, 257.36, 257.44, 257.602b, 257.663, 257.665, 257.666, 
257.817 (2013).  
 42. D.C. CODE § 50-2351 (2012). See also CAL. VEH. CODE § 38750 (West 2012) (defining 
autonomous vehicle as “any vehicle equipped with autonomous technology that has been integrated 
into that vehicle,” and defining autonomous technology as “technology that has the capability to drive 
a vehicle without the active physical control or monitoring by a human operator”); FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 316.003 (West 2012) (defining autonomous vehicle as “[a]ny vehicle equipped with autonomous 
technology. The term ‘autonomous technology’ means technology installed on a motor vehicle that has 
the capability to drive the vehicle on which the technology is installed without the active control or 
monitoring by a human operator.”); MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 257.2b (2013) (defining autonomous 
vehicle as “a motor vehicle on which automated technology has been installed, either by a 
manufacturer of automated technology or an upfitter that enables the motor vehicle to be operated 
without any control or monitoring by a human operator”); NEV. ADMIN. CODE § 482A.010 (2012) 
(defining autonomous vehicle as one “enabled with artificial intelligence and technology that allows 
the vehicle to carry out all the mechanical operations of driving without the active control or 
continuous monitoring of a natural person”). These definitions are also similar to the definition 
provided by the NHTSA. NHTSA, supra note 1. 
 43. NEV. ADMIN. CODE § 482A.010 (2012). See also CAL. VEH. CODE § 38750 (West 2012); 
D.C. CODE § 50-2351 (2012); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 316.003 (West 2012). 
 44. NEV. ADMIN. CODE § 482A.020 (2012). See also CAL. VEH. CODE § 38750 (West 2012); 
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 316.85 (West 2012). 
 45. D.C. CODE § 50-2351 (2012). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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an additional license restriction on individuals interested in driving 
autonomous vehicles.
46
 To operate an autonomous vehicle in Nevada, the 
user must get a “G endorsement” on his or her license, which limits the 
use of the vehicle to daytime driving.
47
  
Insurance requirements also vary. While California and Florida require 
manufacturers of autonomous vehicles to obtain a $5 million insurance or 
surety bond prior to testing of autonomous vehicles,
48
 Nevada requires 
manufacturers to maintain a significantly lower $500,000 insurance or 
surety bond.
49
 Michigan requires insurance in line with normal state 
policies.
50
 Washington D.C. has yet to set an insurance requirement.
51
  
The required safety mechanisms also differ between states. While both 
Nevada and California share robust safety standards, the other states have 
not adopted such stringent standards. Among other requirements, Nevada 
and California require mechanisms for storing data before a collision 
occurs and alert systems that activate when there are issues with the 
autonomous technology.
52
 Florida, Washington D.C., and Michigan have 
 
 
 46. NEV. ADMIN. CODE § 482A.040 (2012). Cf. CAL. VEH. CODE § 38750 (West 2012) (requires 
“proper class of license for vehicle”); D.C. CODE § 50-2351 (2012) (requires valid driver’s license); 
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 316.85 (West 2012) (requires valid driver’s license); MICH. COMP. LAW § 257.665 
(2013) (requires valid driver’s license). 
 47. See NEV. ADMIN. CODE § 482A.040 (2012); Restriction Codes and Descriptions, NEV. DEP’T 
OF MOTOR VEHICLES, http://www.dmvnv.com/pdfforms/restriction_codes.pdf (stating that a G 
restriction limits drivers to “[d]aylight driving only,” explaining that the “restriction is placed on the 
driver license of a person with visual acuity of 20/50 or worse in both eyes, who is required to wear a 
telescopic device while operating a motor vehicle or who holds a motorcycle driver instruction 
permit”).  
 48. CAL. VEH. CODE § 38750 (West 2012); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 316.86 (West 2012). 
 49. NEV. ADMIN. CODE § 482A.210 (2012). The ability to set a lower insurance requirement 
might have influenced Google’s decision to propose autonomous vehicle legislation in Nevada.  
 50. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 257.665 (2013).  
 51. This is indicated by the lack of mention of insurance requirements in the relevant D.C. Code 
sections. See D.C. CODE § 50-2351, 2352 (2012). 
 52. Nevada requires that an autonomous vehicle:  
 (a) Has a separate mechanism in addition to, and separate from, any other mechanism 
required by law, to capture and store the autonomous technology sensor data for at least 30 
seconds before a collision occurs between the autonomous vehicle and another vehicle, object 
or natural person while the vehicle is operating in autonomous mode. The autonomous 
technology sensor data must be captured and stored in a read-only format by the mechanism 
so that the data is retained until extracted from the mechanism by an external device capable 
of downloading and storing the data. . . . 
 (b) Has a switch to engage and disengage the autonomous vehicle that is easily accessible 
to the operator of the autonomous vehicle and is not likely to distract the operator from 
focusing on the road while engaging or disengaging the autonomous vehicle. 
 (c) Has a visual indicator inside the autonomous vehicle which indicates when the 
autonomous vehicle is engaged in autonomous mode. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss5/8
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adopted less stringent standards. Florida requires an alert system in the car 
to indicate trouble with the autonomous technology.
53
 Similarly, 
Washington D.C. only requires that the vehicle “has a manual override 
feature that allows a driver to assume control of the autonomous vehicle at 
any time.”54 Michigan has the same requirement, but its legislature intends 
to revisit the issue of safety in early 2016.
55
 
 
 
 (d) Has a system to safely alert the operator of the autonomous vehicle if a technology 
failure is detected while the autonomous vehicle is engaged in autonomous mode, and when 
such an alert is given, either: 
 (1) Requires the operator to take control of the autonomous vehicle; or 
 (2) If the operator is unable to take control of or is not physically present in the 
autonomous vehicle, is equipped with technology to cause the autonomous vehicle to safely 
move out of traffic and come to a stop . . . . 
NEV. ADMIN. CODE §§ 482A.110, .190(2) (2012). California requires that: 
 (A) The autonomous vehicle has a mechanism to engage and disengage the autonomous 
technology that is easily accessible to the operator. 
 (B) The autonomous vehicle has a visual indicator inside the cabin to indicate when the 
autonomous technology is engaged. 
 (C) The autonomous vehicle has a system to safely alert the operator if an autonomous 
technology failure is detected while the autonomous technology is engaged, and when an alert 
is given, the system shall do either of the following: 
 (i) Require the operator to take control of the autonomous vehicle. 
 (ii) If the operator does not or is unable to take control of the autonomous vehicle, the 
autonomous vehicle shall be capable of coming to a complete stop. 
 (D) The autonomous vehicle shall allow the operator to take control in multiple manners, 
including, without limitation, through the use of the brake, the accelerator pedal, or the 
steering wheel, and it shall alert the operator that the autonomous technology has been 
disengaged . . . . 
 (G) The autonomous vehicle has a separate mechanism, in addition to, and separate from, 
any other mechanism required by law, to capture and store the autonomous technology sensor 
data for at least 30 seconds before a collision occurs between the autonomous vehicle and 
another vehicle, object, or natural person while the vehicle is operating in autonomous mode. 
The autonomous technology sensor data shall be captured and stored in a read-only format by 
the mechanism so that the data is retained until extracted from the mechanism by an external 
device capable of downloading and storing the data. . . . 
CAL. VEH. CODE § 38750 (West 2012). 
 53. Florida requires that an autonomous vehicle have:  
 (a) Have a means to engage and disengage the autonomous technology which is easily 
accessible to the operator. 
 (b) Have a means, inside the vehicle, to visually indicate when the vehicle is operating 
in autonomous mode. 
 (c) Have a means to alert the operator of the vehicle if a technology failure affecting the 
ability of the vehicle to safely operate autonomously is detected while the vehicle is operating 
autonomously in order to indicate to the operator to take control of the vehicle. 
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 319.145 (West 2012). 
 54. D.C. CODE § 50-2352 (2012). 
 55. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 257.665 (2013) (“No later than February 1, 2016, the state 
transportation department in consultation with the secretary of state and experts from various sizes of 
automobile manufacturing and automated technology manufacturing industries shall submit a report 
. . . recommending any additional legislative or regulatory action that may be necessary for the 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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II. ISSUES WITH TORT LIABILITY 
A. Importance of Predetermining Manufacturer’s Tort Costs in 
Autonomous Vehicles 
When autonomous vehicles are released to the general public, 
previously unforeseen legal issues will arise, and car manufacturers will 
require those issues to be handled quickly.
56
 Some of these issues, such as 
safety regulations,
57
 cybersecurity,
58
 insurance,
59
 and the cost of tort 
liability
60
 may be contemplated and dealt with before the release of these 
vehicles. Leading these issues is the cost of tort liability. Despite the fact 
that autonomous vehicles are designed to avoid crashes and keep the roads 
safe, accidents will inevitably occur and liability must be assessed. This 
poses a conundrum for car manufacturers: on the one hand, they want to 
develop autonomous vehicles, but on the other hand, “liability concerns 
might cause them to delay production and rollout.”61 
Car crashes result from a number of environmental, technological, and 
human-related factors. According to a study by the U.S. Department of 
Transportation, the top eight factors involved in fatal car crashes between 
2004 and 2008 were traffic controls, speed and route type, road 
characteristics, weather impacts, traffic flow, crash characteristics, road 
classification, and persons.
62
  
 
 
continued safe testing of automated motor vehicles and automated technology installed in motor 
vehicles.”).  
 56. Fisher, supra note 27 (The creator of Google’s autonomous vehicle technology, David Hall, 
“described a PowerPoint presentation containing the automaker’s [sic] analysis of self-driving-car 
technology. ‘It was about 20 pages long,’ he says, ‘and the last 10 pages were “What’s going to 
happen when we get sued?”‘ Detroit doesn’t want to start making self-driving cars without legal 
clarity. And legal clarity will not arrive until self-driving cars test the law.”). 
 57. NHTSA, supra note 1, at 7 (2013). 
 58. Id. 
 59. See Robert W. Peterson, New Technology—Old Law: Autonomous Vehicles and California’s 
Insurance Framework, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1341, 1355–62 (2012) (describing potential 
insurance regimes for autonomous vehicles). 
 60. See Kyle Graham, Of Frightened Horses and Autonomous Vehicles: Tort Law and Its 
Assimilation of Innovations, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1241, 1246 (2012); Waterman & Henshon, 
supra note 18, at 16; Stephen P. Wood et al., The Potential Regulatory Challenges of Increasingly 
Autonomous Motor Vehicles, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1423 (2012).  
 61. Rachel Boehm, Autonomous Cars Raise Liability Concerns; Some Want Federal, Not State, 
Approach, BLOOMBERG LAW DAILY REP. FOR EXECS, Feb. 4, 2013, available at 
http://www.bloomberglaw.com/search/results/4b7af553cba03cdd965a4e3331a076bf/document/X69552P
4000000?search32=C9P6UQR5E9FN6PB1E9HMGNRKCLP6QFB1ELQ6URJFDLNNASP0EPIMGQ
B3DHIJMER2DTNMOPB1DPFN6PB1E9HMGNRKCLP6QFAE9TA2GF32DPGLUOR1EHIMERRIF
4UI4SJ5E1NN4T127OKJMEREDTFMIRBGBTO6GSJ1EDIN6F9H7CTN6UBEDTN7IRBJ7KOG.  
 62. JENNY GUORINO & AMRUT CHAMPANERI, BUREAU OF TRANSP. STATISTICS, FACTORS 
INVOLVED IN FATAL VEHICLE CRASHES (2010), available at http://www.rita.dot.gov/bts/sites/rita.dot. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss5/8
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Many of the environmental factors such as traffic controls, road 
characteristics, weather impacts, traffic flow, crash characteristics, and 
road classification are congruent across all vehicles, regardless of whether 
they are autonomous or not, and current methods of assessing those factors 
remain adequate for autonomous vehicles. However, due to the advanced 
technology in autonomous vehicles, it may be difficult to separate 
autonomous system malfunctions from driver negligence. Current methods 
of differentiating human error from malfunctioning vehicles may not be 
sufficient to deal with autonomous vehicle crashes. 
The numerous social benefits and cutting-edge technology of 
autonomous vehicles create an attractive, but expensive, investment for 
many companies. The safety and efficiency benefits of autonomous 
vehicles
63
 may positively impact the company’s brand. The special 
functionality of the vehicles will attract early technology adopters and 
those interested in mobility for the disabled community, environmental 
efficiency, and safety. Still, companies may be hesitant to invest in the 
development of the technology because of the high cost of research and 
development, coupled with the potentially high cost of tort liability—or 
damages in case of crashes.
64
 
Put simply, companies are more likely to invest in technology if they 
believe that the technology will produce high returns. The simplest 
calculation of a return on investment is to subtract the cost of an 
 
 
gov.bts/files/publications/bts_technical_report/september_2010/pdf/entire.pdf. Traffic controls are 
defined as “any type of signage or signal with the goal of influencing traffic flow (e.g., stop, yield, or 
warning signs).” Id. at 3. Speed and route type refer to the speeds and type of route that cars are 
traveling on at the time of their accidents. “[A] large proportion of fatal crashes, regardless of size, 
occurred on a state highway. With regard to speed limits, the greatest percentage of fatal crashes 
occurred in a 55 mile-per-hour (mph) zone.” Id. Road characteristics account for “roadway alignment, 
roadway profile, and pavement type.” Id. at 4. Weather impacts “depict[] the relationship between 
weather and roadway surface conditions.” Id. at 4. Traffic flow depicts the movement of cars at the 
time of the accident. Id. at 3. Crash characteristics “relates to the crash’s relation to the roadway and 
the first harmful event which occurred.” Id. at 2. Road classification determines whether crashes 
occurred on national highways or on other roadways. Id. at 4–5. Persons “relates to the relationship 
between the number of persons involved in a fatal crash and fatality counts.” Id. at 2. It should be 
noted that malfunctioning vehicles are not included among the top factors causing car accidents in 
2004 to 2008. 
 63. See supra note 3.  
 64. Furthermore, experts in general robotics hypothesize that concerns about liability might 
cause a negative impact on American society. “M. Ryan Calo, a fellow at the Stanford Law School’s 
Center for Internet and Society and Co-Chair of the Artificial Intelligence and Robotics Committee of 
the ABA, cautions that the uncertainty about liability in the field of robotics could discourage 
innovation and cause the United States to fall behind other countries in a vital area of technological 
development.” Dana M. Mele, The Quasi-Autonomous Car as an Assistive Device for Blind Drivers: 
Overcoming Liability and Regulatory Barriers, 28 SYRACUSE J. SCI. & TECH. L. 26, 40–41 (2013) 
(citing M. Ryan Calo, Open Robotics, 70 MD. L. REV. 571, 576 (2011)). 
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investment from its gains and divide that amount by the cost.
65
 When 
determining whether to make an investment in the development of 
autonomous vehicles, a company must calculate the potential sale price of 
the car, the cost of developing and manufacturing autonomous vehicles, 
and the potential cost of damages in case of a crash. If one of these factors, 
such as the potential cost of damages, becomes unexpectedly high, the 
return on investment will decrease. The cost of damages could increase 
because of the inability of crash investigators to separate system 
malfunction from driver negligence. In that instance, the return might be 
too low to invest in the technology.  
Even though Google did not create its own autonomous vehicle and 
only added autonomous systems to existing cars, it reportedly spent 
$150,000 on each autonomous vehicle.
66
 For car manufacturers, the cost of 
developing autonomous vehicles may be even higher. Whereas Google 
was only concerned with the autonomous technology, a car manufacturer 
must combine cutting-edge technology with user friendly and aesthetically 
pleasing features.
67
  
In 2011, during the period Toyota was beginning to develop semi-
autonomous features in its cars, Toyota spent more than any other 
company in the world on research and development.
68
 It spent nearly $10 
billion on research, amounting to 4.2% of its sales.
69
 While Toyota is 
generally a leader in promoting new technology in its vehicles, such as the 
advent of its successful hybrids, few others are financially able to take the 
risk of developing autonomous vehicles when the return on investment is 
unknown.  
The immense amounts of capital at stake amplify the interest in 
ensuring a reasonable cost of tort liability for manufacturers. Establishing 
 
 
 65. Return on Investment—ROI, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/r/returnon 
investment.asp (last visited Oct. 11, 2013). 
 66. Alisa Priddle & Chris Woodyard, Google Discloses Cost of Its Driverless Car Tests, USA 
TODAY, June 14, 2012, http://content.usatoday.com/communities/driveon/post/2012/06/google-
discloses-costs-of-its-driverless-car-tests/1#.Us7txmRDszA. 
 67. See Toyota Design, TOYOTA, http://www.toyota-global.com/showroom/toyota_design/ (last 
visited Oct. 11, 2013). Toyota’s design philosophy focuses on creating cars that are stylish, and appeal 
to customers on both emotional and rational levels through their color palette, harmonious design, and 
functionality. Id. See also Innovation, AUDI, http://www.audiusa.com/innovation (last visited Oct. 11, 
2013). Audi’s goals are to “defy convention and push performance to the limits. Engineer lighter, 
efficient vehicles. Innovate intelligent technology that anticipates drivers’ needs.” and its aesthetic 
concerns involve developing “silhouettes that defy trends and the wind.” Id. This language clearly 
indicates an interest in cutting-edge technology and style.  
 68. Focus: R&D Spending, THE ECONOMIST GRAPHIC DETAIL (Oct. 30, 2012, 17:22 PM), 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2012/10/focus-7. 
 69. Id.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss5/8
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a reliable system for determining tort liability would ensure that 
manufacturers are liable only to the extent that their technologies 
malfunction and cause a crash. With a reliable system in place, companies 
would be able to decide whether to invest in autonomous vehicles. This 
would “allow more technologies to come to the market faster.”70  
B. Tort Liability in Autonomous Vehicles 
Manufacturers of autonomous vehicles fear that “[w]hen the bells and 
whistles do not sound as they should . . . an increasing amount of liability 
for injuries is likely to bypass drivers and alight on the sellers and 
manufacturers of the vehicle.”71 This fear may be warranted, as an 
autonomous vehicle is a new product with which users have no prior 
experience. As a result, users may be quick to blame the new technology 
for any accidents that may occur, regardless of the actual cause.  
Existing vehicle regulations require constant vigilance by drivers. A 
driver is in control of his vehicle and is responsible for any damage done 
by the vehicle. An autonomous vehicle, however, is designed to take 
control out of the hands of the driver. There has been great debate over 
whether a driver should be liable for the damage caused by a vehicle 
driving autonomously. A number of theories have been raised to address 
this issue, including holding the driver liable for the car’s actions through 
a theory of vicarious liability
72
 and identifying categories of crashes for 
 
 
 70. Waterman & Henshon, supra note 18, at 16. 
 71. Peterson, supra note 59, at 1342. “This would attach . . . major liability to sellers and 
manufacturers of the vehicle.” Id. at 1355. 
 72. One of the most creative theories posited regarding liability for autonomous vehicles is to 
hold the driver liable for the car’s actions through the theory of vicarious liability, a theory generally 
reserved for employer-employee relationships. The employer is vicariously liable for the actions of his 
employee done within the scope of the employee’s employment.  
 “Agency is the fiduciary relationship that arises when one person (a ‘principal’) manifests assent 
to another person (an ‘agent’) that the agent shall act on the principal’s behalf and subject to the 
principal’s control, and the agent manifests assent or otherwise consents so to act.” RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (2006). In the proposed relationship between the driver and the 
autonomous vehicle, the vehicle would be the driver’s agent. As such, the driver would be vicariously 
responsible for the actions of the vehicle. “An employer is subject to liability for torts committed by 
employees while acting within the scope of their employment.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY 
§ 2.04 (2006) (doctrinal definition of vicarious liability). In the proposed relationship, the autonomous 
vehicle, as agent, would act as employee for the driver. The driver, as employer, would be liable for 
the actions of the autonomous vehicle.  
 Although it seems farfetched:  
An autonomous automobile is very much like a driver hired by the owner. It is doing the 
owner’s bidding, and if the car violates the rules of the road and causes an injury, perhaps the 
owner or the one instructing the automobile should be liable as they would be for a similar 
injury caused by the conduct of an agent.  
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which the driver or the manufacturer would be liable to different degrees.
73
 
Regardless of the regime ultimately chosen, product or design defect of an 
autonomous vehicle must be separated from driver negligence.  
To assure manufacturers that they would only be responsible for 
failures on behalf of their product and encourage the production of 
autonomous vehicles, there must be a way to determine driver negligence 
or rather, rule out vehicle malfunction.
74
 There are two situations in which 
the driver should be responsible for negligence: vehicle maintenance and 
emergency situations. First, even though the driver is not actively driving 
the car, the driver is still responsible for the care of the vehicle. As with 
“tires and brakes, owners have a responsibility for maintenance” of the 
autonomous vehicle.
75
 For an autonomous vehicle to function properly, it 
must be maintained and monitored. “Once an owner is or should be aware 
that the automobile is not acting as it should, the owner may be negligent 
in continuing to drive the car until the issue is adequately addressed.”76 
Second, the driver may also be responsible for taking over the car in 
 
 
Peterson, supra note 59, at 1359. This would create a paradigm shift in liability; the inanimate 
autonomous vehicle would itself be liable for its own actions and the owner of the vehicle would be 
vicariously liable.  
 While car manufacturers might favor this proposal, as they would avoid essentially all liability, 
vicarious liability would greatly deter buyers from purchasing an autonomous vehicle. “[T]he 
efficiency of vicarious liability turns on a number of factors, which include . . . the ability of the 
principal to observe the loss-avoidance behavior of the agent . . . .” Alan O. Sykes, The Economics of 
Vicarious Liability, 93 YALE L.J. 1231, 1232 (1984). A rational person would not hire a complete 
stranger to do his bidding without some knowledge of the stranger’s behavior. The same would apply 
to a car; without knowing how the car would function (i.e., avoid loss), a driver would not want to take 
on all responsibility for the car’s autonomous actions.  
 73. The theory examines different driving scenarios (the Distracted Driver, the Diminished 
Capabilities Driver, the Disabled Driver, and the Attentive Driver), and argues that tort liability should 
depend “on the nature of the driver and the ability of that person to prevent the accident [in an 
autonomous vehicle].” Jeffrey K. Gurney, Note, Sue My Car Not Me: Products Liability and Accidents 
Involving Autonomous Vehicles, 2013 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 101, available at http://works. 
bepress.com/jeffrey_gurney/1/. 
 74. As with any negligence claim, a plaintiff must establish the defendant had a duty to the 
plaintiff, the defendant breached that duty, the breach caused the injury, and damages for the injury. 
Mele, supra note 64, at 42 (citing Michael D. Scott, Tort Liability for Vendors of Insecure Software: 
Has the Time Finally Come?, 67 MD. L. REV. 425, 441 (2008)). As with all vehicles, the driver of a 
car owes a duty to care for the vehicle itself, and could breach the duty by failing to respond to 
maintenance signals in the car. If this causes an injury, then the driver will be held liable for his 
negligence. However, it may be difficult to determine whether the driver’s negligence was the sole 
cause of a crash, if the vehicle’s systems were malfunctioning, or if there was some interplay between 
the two that resulted in the crash. It is likely that contributory negligence would play a large part in 
determining the cost of tort liability.  
 75. Peterson, supra note 59, at 1358. 
 76. Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss5/8
  
 
 
 
 
2015] THE BLACK BOX SOLUTION TO AUTONOMOUS LIABILITY 1339 
 
 
 
 
emergency situations, especially in early autonomous vehicles.
77
 If the 
driver is unable to do so or does so poorly for some reason, this may 
constitute negligence as well. 
To assure manufacturers that they will not be unfairly held liable for 
negligence of drivers, steps must be taken to ensure that crash 
investigators are able to accurately determine the cause of an accident. The 
difficulty in separating the fault of the manufacturer from the fault of the 
driver lies in the difficulty of assessing the cause of an accident. With 
existing cars, investigators have the experience necessary to determine 
whether a crash occurred due to vehicle malfunction or driver error. With 
autonomous vehicles, investigators do not have this experience and it is 
unclear how fault would be determined. This ambiguity may raise the cost 
of tort liability, deterring manufacturers from developing and marketing 
autonomous vehicles. To assure manufacturers that tort liability costs will 
be reasonable, a solution must be implemented to ensure that liability is 
reliably determined.  
III. A SOLUTION FOR ASSESSING TORT LIABILITY: THE EVENT DATA 
RECORDER  
A. Analogies to Existing Technology  
When new technology arises, new legal issues “may be resolved by 
reference to analogies that rely on similarities in form.”78 Currently, there 
are autonomous technologies available in the marketplace, such as the 
Roomba, cruise missiles, elevators, and autopilot in airplanes. Of these 
technologies, only autopilot appears to provide a way to separate driver 
negligence from product liability which may be applied to autonomous 
vehicles.  
The Roomba is a robotic vacuum that navigates itself around obstacles 
in a given area, vacuuming with the promise to clean “more thoroughly” 
than a human being.
79
 “The computer algorithms that control them are 
simple, but they appear to make rational decisions as the [sic] scoot around 
 
 
 77. “‘The first generations [of autonomous cars] are going to require a driver to intervene at 
certain points,’ [said] Clifford Nass, codirector of Stanford University’s Center for Automotive 
Research. . . .” Will Knight, Driverless Cars Are Further Away Than You Think, MIT TECH. REV. 
(Oct. 22, 2013), http://www.technologyreview.com/featuredstory/520431/driverless-cars-are-further-
away-than-you-think/. 
 78. Graham, supra note 60, at 1242.  
 79. Why Roomba, IROBOT, http://store.irobot.com/family/index.jsp?categoryId=2501652&s=A-
ProductAge (last visited Jan. 9, 2014).  
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the floor avoiding objects and entertaining your cat.”80 Although 
extremely helpful with chores around the home, the Roomba is unlike 
autonomous vehicles. While it uses technology similar to the sensors on 
autonomous vehicles to navigate, the Roomba has not caused damage that 
has required the manufacturer to separate product liability from negligence 
on part of the machine’s owner. This provides no suggestion for how to 
deal with the issue in autonomous vehicles.  
Cruise missiles are more similar to autonomous vehicles.
81
 Reminiscent 
of the technology used in autonomous vehicles, a cruise missile, after 
being launched, is able to maneuver around terrain features using GPS and 
other navigational systems.
82
 Furthermore, a cruise missile also generally 
operates independent of human control from the inception of its path to its 
final destination.
83
 Despite these similarities, there is a practical difficulty 
in basing a tort liability regime off of a cruise missile. The purpose of a 
cruise missile is to destroy and annihilate its target. Therefore, there has 
generally been no need to separate user negligence from product defect.  
Elevators create a particularly interesting analogy to autonomous 
vehicles. An elevator is one of the few completely autonomous devices 
used regularly today by ordinary consumers. Using mechanical inputs, 
elevators operate independently to transport users from one floor to 
another. Elevators, especially at their inception, were prone to mechanical 
failures that caused accidents, sometimes resulting in loss of human life.
84
 
Over time, “improved technology coupled with increased insurance and 
 
 
 80. Neil M. Richards & William D. Smart, How Should the Law Think About Robots? 6 (May 
10, 2013) (unpublished comment) (available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ 
id=2263363). 
 81. Drones do not pose a good analogy to autonomous vehicles for a number of reasons. Even 
though they seem as though they are completely autonomous, current drones, such as Predators and 
Reapers, are not autonomous—they are manned by pilots from thousands of miles away. Ryan 
Gallagher, Military Moves Closer to Truly Autonomous Drones, SLATE (Jan. 16, 2013), www.slate. 
com/blogs/future-tense/2013/01/16/taranis-newron-militaries-moving-closer-to-truly-autonomous-drones. 
html. Unlike autonomous vehicles, they lack the ability to identify changes in their immediate 
environment and react by themselves. Furthermore, issues of liability are moot, as, if the drone 
completes its mission successfully, it and its target will be completely annihilated.  
 82. Eliot A. Cohen, Five Myths About Cruise Missiles, WASH. POST, Sept. 12, 2013, at A3 (“A 
cruise missile uses one or more guidance systems, including GPS, inertial navigation (following a 
programmed route on the basis of internally stored data), terrain-matching radar (detecting and 
recognizing landmarks as it flies over them) or digital scene matching (same idea, but using imagery 
rather than radar).”); Richards & Smart, supra note 80, at 7.  
 83. See Cohen, supra note 82, at A2 (once a cruise missile has been fired, “crews of missile-
firing destroyers do not welcome back Tomahawks that have decided to return to base”). 
 84. “[E]levator accidents were one of the most common causes of multiple deaths in the early 
twentieth century.” Waterman & Henshon, supra note 18, at 16 (citing James A. Robertson, How 
Umbrella Policies Started Part 2: The First Umbrella Forms, INT’L RISK MGMT INST. (Apr. 2000), 
www.irmi.com/Expert/Articles/2000/Robertson04.aspx). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss5/8
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more stringent regulation permitted the move away from human operator 
oversight.”85 Elevators do not require the sophisticated technology that 
autonomous vehicles do, because they do not need to adapt to changing 
environmental stimuli. Unlike autonomous cars, elevators only operate on 
one axis (up and down), as opposed to two.
86
 The adoption of the same 
industry-wide standards by state legislatures has made elevators much 
safer and has standardized features across the product.
87
 While these 
standards may be instructional for future autonomous vehicles, elevators 
do not provide a helpful method by which to separate user negligence 
from product defect that could be applied to autonomous vehicles.  
Autopilot systems on airplanes
88
 provide the closest analogy to 
autonomous vehicles. Autopilot, originally known as a “gyroscopic 
stabilizer apparatus,” controls the three flight axes of an aircraft (yaw, 
pitch, and roll), and “offset[s] movement in the aircraft through the air, 
opening or closing valves to change wing or rudder angles.”89 Unlike an 
autonomous vehicle, however, “autopilot does not attempt to adapt to 
changing environment, but rather continues on its current heading, at the 
same altitude.”90 In contrast to autopilot, where a pilot provides continued 
input during flight, autonomous vehicles receive nearly no input from the 
driver during use. The autonomous system must perform many functions 
“continuously and asynchronously” leading to difficulty in testing and 
proving the system’s abilities.91 This greatly impacts the potential for 
analogizing liability from an airplane crash to an autonomous vehicle 
crash, because the autopilot is not responsible for adapting to changing 
 
 
 85. Waterman & Henshon, supra note 18, at 16. 
 86. Id.  
 87.  
Though elevators are state regulated, nearly all states have adopted the same industry 
standards. Neither state legislators nor state safety officials attempt to craft the rules for 
autonomous elevator construction and maintenance. Instead, they cite two detailed sets of 
standards created by professional associations: ASCE Code 21 (the American Society of Civil 
Engineers Code 21 for people movers operated by cables) and ASME Code A17 (the 
American Society of Mechanical Engineers Safety Code for Elevators and Escalators). 
Id. 
 88. This is similar to self-parking features on recent cars, but there have been no adjustments to 
vehicle liability, perhaps as there is a very short period of time during which the feature is in control of 
the vehicle.  
 89. Waterman & Henshon, supra note 18, at 14 (citing Lawrence Sperry: Autopilot Inventor and 
Aviation Innovator, HISTORYNET, http://www.historynet.com/lawrence-sperry-autopilot-inventor-and-
aviation-innovator.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2013)). 
 90. Waterman & Henshon, supra note 18, at 14. 
 91. NIDHI KALRA ET AL., CAL.DEP’T TRANSP., UCB-ITS-PRR-2009-28, LIABILITY AND 
REGULATION OF AUTONOMOUS VEHICLE TECHNOLOGIES 8 (2009), available at http://www.path. 
berkeley.edu/PATH/Publications/PDF/PRR/2009/PRR-2009-28.pdf.  
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environmental stimuli. Accordingly, the human pilot must be in control of 
the airplane at all times, and adjusting to any changes in the 
environment.
92
 
Although not a perfect analogy, autopilot shares an important similarity 
with autonomous vehicles: the need to separate user error from system 
error. To address this problem, airplanes are federally required to carry 
Flight Data Recorders (“FDRs”) onboard.93 These FDRs are used to 
collect and retain information about the time, altitude, airspeed, vertical 
acceleration, heading time of each radio transmission either to or from air 
traffic control, pitch attitude, roll attitude, longitudinal acceleration, 
control column or pitch control surface position, and thrust of each 
engine.
94
 The collection of this information tells investigators the story of 
the airplane’s operations and functionality, as well as pilot error. Through 
this information, investigators are able to determine the cause of the crash, 
whether by human error, technological failure, or outside cause.
95
 
Collecting such data in autonomous vehicles would be equally useful in 
determining the cause of autonomous vehicle crashes.  
B. Implementation of Event Data Recorders in Autonomous Vehicles  
To reasonably assign liability to manufacturer or driver in an 
autonomous vehicle crash, autonomous vehicles should be required to 
carry Event Data Recorders (“EDRs”), similar to the FDRs required on 
airplanes. This abides by the NHTSA’s recommendation that “[s]elf-
 
 
 92. Also, “most airplane accidents involve departures or landings, which are generally not when 
autopilots are in use . . . Although there are a handful of reported cases where autopilots played a role 
in the accident, in most cases the autopilot plays a lesser role than human oversight.” Waterman & 
Henshon, supra note 18, at 14 (citations omitted). 
 The vehicular analogy to autopilot would be engaging cruise control in a car. While the car is 
maintaining the same speed, the driver is responsible for guiding it along the road.  
 93.  
No person may operate a U.S. civil registered, multiengine, turbine-powered airplane or 
rotorcraft having a passenger seating configuration, excluding any pilot seats of 10 or more 
that has been manufactured after October 11, 1991, unless it is equipped with one or more 
approved flight recorders that utilize a digital method of recording and storing data and a 
method of readily retrieving that data from the storage medium, that are capable of recording 
the data specified in appendix E to this part, for an airplane, or appendix F to this part, for a 
rotorcraft, of this part within the range, accuracy, and recording interval specified, and that 
are capable of retaining no less than 8 hours of aircraft operation.  
14 C.F.R. § 91.609(c) (2010). 
 94. See Flight Data Recorder Rule Change, BOEING AERO MAG., at 6, http://www.boeing.com/ 
commercial/aeromagazine/aero_02/textonly/s01txt.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2015). 
 95. Id. at 1. “The data collected in the FDR system can help investigators determine whether an 
accident was caused by pilot error, by an external event (such as windshear), or by an airplane system 
problem.”  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss5/8
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driving test vehicles should record data from the vehicle’s sensors, 
including sensors monitoring and diagnosing the performance of the 
automated vehicle technologies, in the event of a crash, or other significant 
loss of vehicle control.”96 An EDR would be well equipped to record the 
information suggested (data from the vehicle’s sensors and engagement of 
automated technology) by the NHTSA. Although the NHTSA’s 
recommendation was only extended to “test vehicles,” the same idea could 
be applied to all autonomous vehicles to provide a simple solution for 
determining liability in autonomous vehicle crashes.  
The idea of an EDR, used in vehicles, is based on the concept of an 
FDR, used on airplanes. An FDR is required on all “registered, 
multiengine, turbine-powered airplane or rotorcraft having a passenger 
seating configuration, excluding any pilot seats of 10 or more that has 
been manufactured after October 11, 1991.”97 The regulation has been in 
effect since 1988 and continues to require FDRs on airplanes.
98
 FDRs are 
invaluable to plane crash investigators. The FDR “records the many 
different operating functions of a plane all at once, such as the time, 
altitude, airspeed and direction the plane is heading.”99 These functions, 
along with other actions “such as the movement of individual flaps on the 
wings, auto-pilot and fuel gauge,” allow crash investigators to reconstruct 
a flight “so that they can visualise [sic] how a plane was handling shortly 
before a crash.”100 
Access to the same types of information for an autonomous vehicle 
crash would be equally useful. Investigators could determine, using actual 
data recorded in the vehicle, the exact functioning of the autonomous 
vehicle leading up to time of the crash. This type of information was so 
useful that the NHTSA has considered requiring EDRs on all light 
 
 
 96. NHTSA, supra note 1, at 14. 
 97. 14 C.F.R. § 91.609(c) (2010). 
 98.  
The FAA issued Amendment Nos. 23-35, 25-65, 27-22, 29-25, 91-204, 121-197, 125-10, and 
135-26 June 30, 1988 (53 FR 26134; July 11, 1988), to require digital flight data recorders 
and cockpit voice recorders to be installed in a broad range of airplanes and rotorcraft 
operated by air carriers and commuter airlines, as well as in selected aircraft operated in 
general aviation. Compliance is required by October 11, 1991. The amendments respond to 
legislation that required the FAA to amend its FR and CVR requirements in accordance with 
recommendations from the National Transportation Safety Board. The intent of the 
amendments was to provide more information to accident investigators in determining the 
causes of accidents and the measures needed to correct the causes. 
56 FED. REG. 51,618 (1991). 
 99. What Is a Black Box?, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC CHANNEL, http://natgeotv.com.au/tv/air-crash-
investigation/what-is-a-black-box.aspx (last visited Jan. 9, 2014).  
 100. Id. 
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vehicles (e.g., passenger vehicles). In 2006, the NHTSA set standards for 
EDRs in cars that voluntarily chose to include them.
101
 The NHTSA 
described an EDR as “a device or function in a vehicle that records the 
vehicle’s dynamic, time-series data during the time period just prior to a 
crash event (e.g., vehicle speed vs. time) or during a crash event (e.g., 
delta-V vs. time), intended for retrieval after the crash event.”102 
1. EDRs in Current Vehicles 
Although the NHTSA considered mandating the installation of EDRs 
in light vehicles in 2006, it decided not to do so because sixty-four of new 
vehicles were voluntarily being equipped with such devices.
103
 In 
December 2012, the NHTSA revisited the issue and published a Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking for Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards and 
Event Data Recorders in the Federal Register (“Notice”).104 This Notice 
suggested “a new safety standard mandating the installation of EDRs in 
most light vehicles manufactured on or after September 1, 2014.”105 The 
NHTSA published findings that the mandate would not be particularly 
expensive, averaging $20.00 per vehicle.
106
 By its calculations, if most 
light vehicles were to be equipped with EDRs, the “estimated total 
incremental costs associated with this proposal would be $26.4 million 
 
 
 101. 49 C.F.R. §§ 563.6–.11 (2006).  
 102. Event Data Recorders, 71 Fed. Reg. 50,998, 51,001 (Aug. 28, 2006) (to be codified at 49 
C.F.R. pt. 563). 
 103. Id. at 50999.  
 104. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, 77 Fed. Reg. 74,144 (proposed Dec. 13, 2012) (to 
be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 571). In its proposal, the NHTSA outlined the benefits of accepting the 
proposal:  
The benefits of this proposal would be to expand and, therefore, enhance the utilization of the 
recorded information and lead to further improvements in the safety of current vehicles as 
well as future ones . . . . It is important to have EDR data relating to the crash experiences of 
vehicles with these advanced safety systems so that the agency can, at the earliest possible 
time, gather enough information about emerging advanced technologies to conduct reliable 
analyses and make policy judgments. Additionally, the agency’s experience in handling 
unintended acceleration and pedal entrapment allegations has demonstrated that EDR data 
from a particular vehicle model can have significant value to both the agency and the 
vehicle’s manufacturer to identify and address safety concerns associate with possible defects 
in the design or performance of the vehicle. To serve this purpose for all light vehicles 
required to have frontal air bags, EDR data must be available for all such vehicles. 
Id. at 74,146. 
 105. Id. at 74,144 (“The EDRs in those vehicles would be required by the new standard to meet 
the data elements, data capture and format, data retrieval, and data crash survivability requirements of 
the existing regulation. This proposal would not modify any of the requirements or specifications in 
the regulation for EDRs voluntarily installed between September 1, 2012 and September 1, 2014.”). 
 106. Id. at 74,146.  
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(2010 dollars), which reflects the need for technology improvements, as 
well as assembly costs, compliance costs, and paperwork maintenance 
costs.”107 The total costs of the proposed rule, including the burden on 
private citizens and corporations, would be $314.2 million annually.
108
 It 
also noted that ninety-two percent of new light vehicles in 2012 are 
voluntarily equipped with EDRs, and only 1.32 million vehicles would 
need to install an EDR.
109
  
More than 1000 comments were collected regarding the Notice.
110
 
These comments were from a number of interested private individuals,
111
 
professional organizations, and interest groups.
112
 The comments from 
individuals present a number of privacy concerns
113
 and business groups 
convey their fear of “significant and unnecessary burdens upon both 
 
 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 74,155. The NHTSA further expounded: 
In determining the costs of this proposed rule under the [Paperwork Reduction Act (“PRA”)], 
we estimate that there are approximately 15.71 million applicable vehicles produced annually, 
14.39 million of which are already voluntarily equipped with EDRs. The cost to install an 
EDR meeting the requirements of this proposed rule is $20 per vehicle if a vehicle does not 
have an EDR. The costs of this proposed rule under the PRA include the costs of installing 
compliant EDRs on all applicable vehicles, even those that are currently equipped with EDRs. 
Accordingly, the annual total costs of this proposed rule under the PRA would be $314.20 
million.  
Id. 
 109. Id. at 74,145.  
 110. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards Event Data Recorders, REGULATIONS.GOV, 
http://www.regulations.gov/#!docketBrowser;rpp=100;so=DESC;sb=docId;po=0;dct=PS;D=NHTSA-
2012-0177 (last visited Dec. 27, 2014).  
 111. See, e.g., Brandy Johnson—Comments, REGULATIONS.GOV, http://www.regulations.gov/ 
#!documentDetail;D=NHTSA-2012-0177-1037 (last visited Jan. 12, 2014); Douglas Wilkinson—
Comments, REGULATIONS.GOV, http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=NHTSA-2012-0177-
1034 (last visited Jan. 12, 2014). 
 112. Interest and business groups such as the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, Chrysler 
Group LLC, the Electronic Privacy Information Center, and the Electronic Frontier Foundation all 
attached documents with their commentary. See Chrysler Group LLC—Comments, REGULATIONS. 
GOV, http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=NHTSA-2012-0177-1010 (last visited Jan. 12, 
2014); Electronic Frontier Foundation—Comments, REGULATIONS.GOV, http://www.regulations.gov/ 
#!documentDetail;D=NHTSA-2012-0177-0977 (last visited Jan. 12, 2014); Electronic Privacy 
Information Center—Comments, REGULATIONS.GOV, http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail; 
D=NHTSA-2012-0177-1006 (last visited Jan. 12, 2014); Insurance Institute for Highway Safety—
Comments, REGULATIONS.GOV, http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=NHTSA-2012-
0177-1016 (last visited Jan. 12, 2014). These comments contain specific concerns about the data 
collected, potential secondary uses, and fear of overreach by the federal government.  
 113. See Insurance Institute for Highway Safety—Comments, regulations.gov, http://www. 
regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=NHTSA-2012-0177-1016 (last visited Jan. 12, 2014); Electronic 
Privacy Information Center—Comments, regulations.gov, http://www.regulations.gov/#!document 
Detail;D=NHTSA-2012-0177-1006 (last visited Jan. 12, 2014); Electronic Frontier Foundation—
Comments, regulations.gov, http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=NHTSA-2012-0177-
0977 (last visited Jan. 12, 2014). These comments contain specific concerns about the data collected, 
potential secondary uses, and fear of overreach by the federal government. 
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vehicle manufacturers and the agency.”114 Although the comments have 
been collected, the proposed regulation has not been adopted and codified 
in the Code of Federal Regulations.  
In March 2012, Congress considered a bill that would mandate EDRs 
in current vehicles.
115
 Although the Senate passed the bill, the House of 
Representatives did not.
116
 The bill would have mandated EDRs in all 
“new passenger motor vehicles” and established ownership of the data by 
the owners or lessees of the vehicle.
117
 
2. Advantages and Disadvantages of EDRs in Current Vehicles 
There have been numerous discussions regarding EDRs in current 
vehicles. Proponents of EDRs in light vehicles argue that the benefits 
outweigh the costs: installing EDRs in current vehicles helps crash 
investigators determine the cause of an accident and helps car 
manufacturers to develop safer vehicles.
118
 These uses are beneficial to 
society. In the event of a car crash, investigators would be able to 
accurately pinpoint—or rule out—potential causes. This would decrease 
and resolve disputes about liability. The development of safer vehicles has 
great potential to save lives and economic resources. Although the $314 
million burden placed on government, individuals, and corporations is 
hefty, it may be an efficient decision considering the long-term benefits of 
EDRs in light vehicles.  
 
 
 114. See, e.g., Chrysler Group LLC—Comments, REGULATIONS.GOV, http://www.regulations.gov/ 
#!documentDetail;D=NHTSA-2012-0177-1010 (last visited Jan. 12, 2014).  
 115. S. 1813, 112th Cong. (2012); H.R. 2374, 112th Cong. (2012).  
 116. Based on S. 1813’s legislative history, it is unclear whether the bill was discussed on the 
floor of the House of Representatives. The Senate engrossed S. 1813 on March 14, 2012, but there was 
no further action on it. 112 S. 1813 MAP-21, PROQUEST CONGRESSIONAL, http://congressional. 
proquest.com (search “112S 1813”) (last visited Apr. 5, 2015). 112 H.R. 2374 was introduced and 
referred to the House Subcommittee on Commerce, Manufacturing, and Trade on June 24, 2011, but 
no further action was taken. Bill Summary & Status: 112th Congress (2011-2012) H.R. 2374, 
CONGRESS.GOV (search “112 H.R. 2374) (last visited Apr. 5, 2015). 
 117. S. 1813, 112th Cong. (2013).  
 118. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Event Data Recorders, 77 Fed. Reg. 74,144, 74,145 
(proposed Dec. 13, 2012). 
EDR data are used to improve crash and defect investigation and crash data collection quality 
to assist safety researchers, vehicle manufacturers, and the agency to understand vehicle 
crashes better and more precisely. Additionally, vehicle manufacturers are able to utilize EDR 
data in improving vehicle designs and developing more effective vehicle safety 
countermeasures. EDR data can also be used by Advanced Automatic Crash Notification 
(AACN) systems to aid emergency response teams in assessing the severity of a crash and 
estimating the probability of serious injury before they reach the site of the crash. 
Id. 
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Opponents of EDRs in light vehicles have successfully argued against 
EDRs on three grounds: car prices, redundancy, and privacy. First, the 
National Motorists Association (“NMA”)119 argues that implementing 
EDRs in vehicles will unnecessarily raise car prices as car manufacturers 
pass on the cost of adding the instrument to vehicles on to the unwilling 
purchaser.
120
 Second, these groups argue that car owners should not be 
coerced to use EDRs in judicial or enforcement hearings in the interest of 
fairness.
121
 Finally, the NMA argues that it is unnecessary for the entire 
population to adopt the instrument because many cars are already 
equipped with EDRs.
122
 Therefore, it would be redundant to force 
unwilling car owners to add EDRs.  
Other groups, such as the American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”), 
have spoken out opposing EDRs for their potential to infringe on 
individual privacy. The NHTSA in its proposed regulation acknowledged 
the potential privacy concerns of EDRs: “who owns it, who has access to 
it and under what circumstances, and what are the purposes for which it 
may be used” remain open questions.123 In its consideration of the EDR 
mandate, the ACLU proposed that the data on EDRs belong to the owner 
of the vehicle.
124
 Without ownership by the car owner, law enforcement or 
other parties would be able to access the data without the consent of the 
car owner or a search warrant.
125
 This would give the government and 
other entities unlimited access to the data as well as the ability to track and 
store all of a vehicle’s movements, locations, and other information 
regarding the vehicle’s actions.  
Lastly, opponents may argue that EDRs have limited usefulness when 
investigating a crash.
126
 As EDRs do not possess the ability to track driver 
 
 
 119. The National Motorists Association is a special interest group formed in 1982 to combat the 
55 mph National Maximum Speed Limit. They have since taken on a number of other issues related to 
driving, explaining that “we want to drive what we want to drive, go where we want to go and in the 
process not be unwitting cannon fodder for self-serving government programs, over-bearing police 
departments or greedy courts.” About Us, NAT’L MOTORISTS ASS’N, http://www.motorists.org/about/ 
(last visited Feb. 2, 2015). 
 120. Black Boxes Fact Sheet, NAT’L MOTORISTS ASS’N, http://www.motorists.org/black-
boxes/black-box-fact-sheet.pdf. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Event Data Recorders, 77 Fed. Reg. 74,144, 74,146 
(proposed Dec. 13, 2012). 
 124. Jay Stanley, A Look at the Issues Raised by ‘Black Boxes’ in Cars, ACLU (Dec. 10, 2012, 
12:20 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/technology-and-liberty/black-boxes-cars-may-set-important-
precedents. 
 125. Id. 
 126.  Thomas Michael Kowalick, Real-World Perceptions of Emerging Event Data Recorder 
(EDR) Technologies, NHTSA, 5 (finding that college-age motorists perceive that “EDRs may provide 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
1348 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 92:1325 
 
 
 
 
error, they do not reveal whether the driver was distracted. These 
distractions might include falling asleep at the wheel or texting while 
driving. As human error accounts for the majority of accidents, EDRs may 
not be able to explain why most current vehicles crash and have a very 
limited use.  
C. The Impact of EDRs in Autonomous Vehicles  
Arguments for and against mandating EDRs in autonomous vehicles 
are similar to those in current vehicles. However, an EDR in an 
autonomous vehicle is more useful than an EDR in a human operated 
vehicle. For reasons discussed below, EDRs should be required in 
autonomous vehicles.  
In autonomous vehicles, the data recording would be especially helpful 
in untangling the issue of driver negligence from product defect or system 
failure. Unlike drivers in traditional vehicles, the driver in an autonomous 
vehicle is actively not paying attention to driving. With human error 
generally removed as a potential cause for accidents, the data from an 
autonomous vehicle’s EDR would provide a better picture of the 
functioning vehicle than of one from a traditional vehicle. The EDR’s data 
would, therefore, assure autonomous vehicle manufacturers that they 
would not be liable for drivers’ negligence. Instead, manufactures would 
only be liable for the malfunctioning systems. This would encourage 
manufacturers to produce autonomous vehicles because they would be 
able to accurately estimate the costs of liability involved with autonomous 
vehicles. Bearing in mind the social benefits of autonomous vehicles, the 
lower price to market entrance by manufacturers would be favorable.  
Given the complex systems involved in autonomous vehicles,
127
 it is 
especially important to distinguish system error from driver negligence. 
Even with the highly sophisticated technology, it is likely that there will be 
unforeseen errors in an autonomous vehicle’s programming or machinery. 
When combined with inexperienced drivers, it may be difficult to 
distinguish between a system malfunction and negligence in the event of a 
crash. With the installation of the EDR, the data stored on the device 
would provide information about the source of the crash if it were caused 
by the vehicle’s autonomous or other technology. This would efficiently 
determine—or rule out—whether the cause of the crash was a malfunction 
 
 
only a part of a complex crash scenario. . . EDR data may have little or no immediate value to victims 
of crashes. . . .”).  
 127. See NIDHI KALRA ET AL., supra note 91.  
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of autonomous vehicle technology, reassuring manufacturers that they 
would be liable for a crash only if their technology malfunctioned.  
The cost of installing EDRs in autonomous vehicles would be 
comparable to the cost of installing them in current vehicles—roughly $20 
per vehicle, and adding up to around $314 million annually.
128
 As a result 
of anticipated social benefits, autonomous vehicles would actually create 
savings for the American government. Google anticipates a 90% drop in 
car crashes and a 90% reduction in commute times, which would save the 
United States roughly $400 billion per year.
129
 Based on these statistics, 
the American government would save more than $500 billion by installing 
EDRs, far outweighing the $314 million price tag to install them. Thus, if 
autonomous vehicles were released and reached their anticipated social 
benefits, America would benefit economically.  
IV. PRIVACY CONCERNS REGARDING EDRS IN AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES 
Given the valid concerns of many leading civil rights organizations 
regarding privacy and EDRs, it is imperative to consider the protections 
that should be put into place to create an environment that benefits both 
corporations and consumers. Both producers and consumers of 
autonomous vehicles stand to gain from the release of these vehicles on to 
the market. To support both parties, a balance must be struck between 
protecting the interests of the producers by limiting potential liability costs 
with the use of EDRs and protecting the privacy of consumers who are 
using these vehicles.  
As mentioned above, the ACLU has taken a strong stance against the 
adoption of EDRs without restrictions on use of data collected by the 
devices.
130
 Among the ACLU’s concerns is that the data provided by the 
EDR may not belong solely to the car’s owner.131 This concern arises in 
the many circumstances in which personal data is used for commercial 
purposes—for example, Google and Facebook are both known for 
utilizing information gathered from consumers using their services to 
 
 
 128. 71 Fed. Reg. 74144, 74155 (proposed Dec. 13, 2013). 
 129. Chunka Mui, Fasten Your Seatbelts: Google’s Driverless Car Is Worth Trillions (Part 1), 
FORBES (Jan. 22, 2013, 10:12 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/chunkamui/2013/01/22/fasten-your-
seatbelts-googles-driverless-car-is-worth-trillions/. For a discussion of the potential lost revenues as a 
result of the autonomous vehicle, see Chunka Mui, Google’s Trillion-Dollar Driverless Car—Part 2: 
The Ripple Effects, FORBES (Jan. 24, 2013, 9:36 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/chunkamui/2013/ 
01/24/googles-trillion-dollar-driverless-car-part-2-the-ripple-effects/. 
 130. Stanley, supra note 124. 
 131. Id.  
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tailor advertisements toward specific individuals.
132
 This equates to an 
exchange of private information for use of these electronic services.
133
  
One could imagine a similar fate for autonomous vehicles. For 
instance, imagine:  
On a future road trip, your robot car decides to take a new route, 
driving you past a Krispy Kreme Doughnut shop. A pop-up window 
opens on your car’s display and asks if you’d like to stop at the 
store. “Don’t mind if I do,” you think to yourself. You press “yes” 
on the touchscreen, and the autonomous car pulls up to the shop.
134
 
Vehicle manufacturers could easily sell the data collected from individuals 
to commercial retailers and tailor ads specific to individual vehicle 
owners. Even more disconcertingly, manufacturers might also provide the 
vehicle’s location information to law enforcement officials without the 
requirement of a warrant.
135
 To avoid such exchanges of data, there are a 
number of safeguards and restrictions that could protect consumers.  
In the language of the Senate and House of Representative bills 
regarding EDRs, proposals were included that would give full ownership 
of the data on an EDR to the owner of the vehicle.
136
 This would be a safe 
starting point to ensure that the personal data is not used without the 
vehicle owner’s permission. 
Consumer protection should not end with ownership rights. Even if 
vehicle owners own EDR data, there are still concerns regarding the 
transfer of the data from owner to the vehicle manufacturer via contract. In 
the past, implied contract provisions have been suggested as ways of 
preventing disclosure of personal information.
137
 If new regulations 
prohibited the use of commercial data without informed consent by 
vehicle owners, the data mining of private information that has occurred in 
various online services may not be used  
 
 
 132. NEIL RICHARDS, INTELLECTUAL PRIVACY 3–10, 128–32, 182 (2015).  
 133. Joseph W. Jerome, Buying and Selling Privacy: Big Data’s Different Burdens and Benefits, 
66 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 47, 48 (2013) (citing Joe Mullin, How Much Do Google and Facebook 
Profit from Your Data?, ARS TECHNICA (Oct. 9, 2012, 6:38 AM PDT), http://arstechnica.com/tech-
policy/2012/10/how-much-do-google-and-facebook-profit-from-your-data/).  
 134. Patrick Lin, What If Your Autonomous Vehicle Keeps Routing You Past Krispy Kreme?, THE 
ATLANTIC (Jan. 22, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2014/01/what-if-your-
autonomous-car-keeps-routing-you-past-krispy-kreme/283221/.  
 135. Stanley, supra note 124. 
 136. S. 1813, 112th Cong. (2012); H.R. 2374, 112th Cong. (2012). S. 1813 would also give 
ownership of the data to a vehicle’s lessee.  
 137. JON L. MILLS, PRIVACY: THE LOST RIGHT 297–99 (2008).  
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If regulations create a legal standard that commercial use of EDR data 
is prohibited without informed consent by vehicle owners, it is possible to 
ensure that the data mining of private information that has occurred 
through use of various online services will not occur with EDRs. 
Consumer protection should also extend to the encryption and anonymity 
of the data that must be transmitted to a network for the autonomous 
vehicle to function. Transmitted personal information should not be 
traceable to the vehicle of origin, and the data involved must be 
encrypted.
138
 
Due to potential high returns on their investments, the burden of adding 
EDRs to autonomous vehicles is comparatively low. As a result, 
autonomous vehicle producers should not be dissuaded from the decision 
to manufacture and market autonomous vehicles. At the same time, these 
safeguards will protect consumers’ privacy while maintaining the benefits 
of autonomous vehicles for society. By implementing these regulations, an 
efficient equilibrium for producers, consumers, and society may be 
defined.  
V. CONCLUSION 
Autonomous vehicles have the potential to create immense positive 
change, but they come with a high price tag. The high cost is driven in part 
by the uncertainty regarding the cost of liability in case of car crashes. To 
effectively separate driver negligence from product or design defect, EDRs 
should be required in all autonomous vehicles. As EDR data may be used 
against consumers’ interests, implantation of EDRs necessitates a 
balancing of both producer and consumer interests. To protect consumer 
privacy, regulations regarding data ownership and use must be put in 
place. With these regulations in place, consumers would be protected and 
society could reap the tremendous benefits associated with autonomous 
vehicles.  
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